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Introduction
China first implemented the export tax rebate policy in 
1985. This policy enables export companies to get a partial 
or total refund for the indirect tax paid during the production 
and distribution processes. In the agricultural sectors, the 
export tax rebate is implemented not only in order to provide 
the exporting firms with a higher profit, but also in order to 
enhance the income of farm producers. This is due to the 
connection between the retail and farm markets, and thus the 
tax rebate is considered to alleviate the poverty of China’s 
rural population (which accounted for 50.32% of the total 
population in 2016, according to FAO data). 
However, this policy imposes a heavy fiscal burden on 
the Chinese government, and the large size of the rebates can 
be said to crowd out government expenditures on education, 
social security, etc. (Cui, 2003). An export tax rebate can be 
split between an increase in the domestic price and a reduc-
tion in the export price, and thus improves foreign consum-
ers’ welfare. Many financial commentators point out that in 
some industries, the tax rebate is decreasing the export price 
to a larger extent than increasing the domestic supply price. 
Hence it works more to subsidise foreign consumers than 
domestic producers. As a result, the debate over whether this 
policy should be abolished in certain sectors continues. 
The effects of the export tax rebate have attracted much 
attention in the literature. Most studies find a positive rela-
tionship between the tax or tariff rebate and exports (Chao 
et al., 2001; Chandra and Long, 2013; Chen et al., 2006; Gour-
don et al., 2017), except for one case in the agricultural and 
food industry (Chao et al., 2006). However, when it comes 
to welfare effects, studies on export tax rebates or export 
subsidies mainly focus on the whole country’s welfare (e.g., 
Brander and Spencer, 1985; Chao et al., 2006; Jarvis, 2012; 
Yin and Yin, 2005). Few discuss how the welfare gains or 
losses are distributed among different groups in a specific sec-
tor, including domestic producers, domestic consumers, and 
foreign consumers at the retail level, or among suppliers of 
different inputs. An export promotion policy (such as an export 
subsidy or export tax rebate) increases the domestic price and 
thus, according to the price theory, such a policy improves the 
domestic producers’ welfare at the expense of domestic con-
sumers’ surplus. However, is it possible that the beneficiaries 
are foreign consumers, instead of domestic producers? What 
affects the welfare distribution effects of such policy? Moreo-
ver, in an agricultural sector, how does such a policy affect the 
farm and non-farm input producers? As mentioned before, the 
export tax rebate imposes a heavy fiscal burden on the govern-
ment, and may be detrimental to domestic consumers; thus, it 
is important to address these questions.
This paper attempts partially to fill this gap by simulating 
the incidence of the export tax rebate, including the price 
effects and the distribution of welfare gains among differ-
ent groups in an agricultural sector with a partial equilibrium 
approach. Then, the model is applied to the Chinese fish-
ery sector, which provides a typical context for the disputes 
on the export tax rebate policy. In 2008, the rebate rate for 
several types of fishery products1 was increased from 5% to 
13%. Critics have pointed out that the export tax rebate is 
subsidising foreign consumers and that domestic produc-
ers are getting few benefits, and thus this policy results in a 
waste of taxpayers’ money.
In this paper, we first use an equilibrium displacement 
model (EDM) to investigate the effects of the export tax 
rebate on prices and trade flows. EDMs are widely used to 
evaluate the effects of exogenous shocks in food and agricul-
ture sectors, especially those caused by government policies 
(Dhoubhadel et al., 2015; Gardner, 1975; Kinnucan and Cai, 
2011; Leister et al., 2015; Wohlgenant, 1989). Then, follow-
ing the method of Sun and Kinnucan (2001), we calculate the 
distribution of welfare changes for Chinese domestic pro-
ducers, domestic consumers, and foreign consumers using 
the EDM simulation results. 
1 They include frozen tilapia, frozen tilapia fillets, frozen crustacean, molluscs, etc.
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Although the policy is implemented at the retail level, 
we also consider the farm level and the linkage between the 
two levels, as not considering such vertical linkage may pro-
duce inaccurate results. In this paper, Wohlgenant’s (1989) 
method is followed since the retail and the farm markets 
are linked through the retail price and the farm price. In this 
way, we are able to obtain not only more accurate results for 
the retail market, but also a realistic estimate of the benefits’ 
allocation between producers of farm and non-farm inputs at 
the input level.
Methodology
Model
Consider a simplified situation in which retail producers 
purchase inputs from the farm market to produce a homo-
geneous product and sell them in both domestic and export 
markets. An export tax rebate is implemented in the retail 
market for the export goods. The industry is assumed to be 
competitive within the country2 and the Law of One Price 
holds. The economy is large in that it affects the world price. 
Ignoring all tariffs and other trade barriers, the initial equi-
librium of an agricultural sector can be defined as follows:
Retail market: 
 (Domestic demand) (1)
 (Inverse supply) (2)
 (Export demand) (3)
 (Domestic price) (4)
 (Export price) (5)
 (Market clearing) (6)
Farm market:
 (Inverse demand) (7)
 (Supply) (8)
 (Market clearing) (9)
In this model for China, DR and SR are the retail-level 
domestic demand and supply, respectively; XR is the retail-
level export;   is the retail-level domestic demand price;  
 is the retail-level export price;   is the retail-level sup-
ply price; DF and SF are the farm-level demand and supply, 
respectively; and PF is the farm-level price. The variables 
VAT and ETR represent the value-added tax and the export 
tax rebate3, respectively. Then, an isolated increase in  VAT 
increases both domestic and export prices, while an isolated 
increase in ETR increases the domestic price and reduces the 
export price. Finally, PN is the price of non-farm inputs. The 
retail- and farm-level markets are linked by the domestic 
retail-level supply equation and the farm-level demand equa-
2 According to Enke (1944) and Kinnucan and Zhang (2004), when one takes into 
account the ability of the government to exercise market power, a country within which 
there is pure competition amongst buyers and sellers can be treated as a “large econo-
my”, which means that when it acts as a collective unit, this country holds monopoly 
power or monopsony power to influence the world price.
3 VAT = 1+ rV  , where rV is the rate of value-added tax; ETR=1 + rg , where rg is the 
rate of export tax rebate.
tion. Overall, this model contains nine endogenous variables 
(DR, SR, XR, , , , DF, SF, and PF) and three exogenous 
variables (VAT, ETR, and PN).
4
By taking the total differential, the model can be written 
in the equilibrium displacement form, which characterizes 
the change in equilibrium prices and quantities from shifts in 
VAT and ETR, as follows: 
Retail market:
  (10)
  (11)
  (12)
  (13)
  (14)
  (15)
Farm market:
  (16)
  (17)
  (18)
Here, the asterisked variables refer to approximate rela-
tive changes (e.g., ,). Parameters are defined 
in Table 1. For normal sloping supply and demand curves, 
 and .
The distribution of benefits brought by the export tax 
rebate can be measured in two ways: by the passing on of the 
export rebate to Chinese producers and foreign consumers 
and by the welfare distribution among each group. 
The pass-through of the export tax rebate
By imposing the market clearing conditions and drop-
ping equations (12) and (14), China’s export supply equation 
can be obtained as follows:
 (19)
where  is China’s export supply elasti-
city with respect to the retail supply price. For normal para-
meter values, , indicating that the increase in the sup-
ply price increases the export supply to the international 
market.   and  are the export 
supply elasticities with respect to the farm price and the price 
of non-farm inputs, respectively. Both of them are negative, 
implying that a higher input price reduces the export supply. 
The effect of the value-added tax on the export supply is 
indicated by , which takes positive values. This 
means that a higher value-added tax on the retail domestic 
market increases the export supply.
Then, by equalizing equations (19) and (12) and substi-
tuting (14), the retail supply price can be obtained:
 
(20)
4 All other exogenous variables that may affect demand and supply are assumed 
to be constant, and hence are suppressed. PN (e.g., the price of marketing service) is 
assumed to be exogenously given to simplify the derivation of the price transmission 
elasticities (see Appendix A for details).
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When the linkage between the farm and the retail mar-
kets is not considered, the reduced form of the elasticity of 
supply price with respect to the export tax rebate is repre-
sented by , which is restricted to being a posi-
tive value, indicating that an export tax rebate on the export 
products causes the supply price to move up. Hence, the 
effect of the tax rebate on the supply price is determined by 
the relative magnitude of the export demand and supply elas-
ticities. When the domestic producers face a perfectly elastic 
export demand curve or a perfectly inelastic export supply 
curve, then . This means that the export tax 
rebate is completely passed on to Chinese producers, and 
thus it has the largest possible effect. In contrast, when China 
has a perfectly elastic export supply curve or a perfectly 
inelastic export demand curve, , that is, the 
tax rebate has no impact on domestic producers. As derived 
above, , indicating that a larger retail 
supply elasticity, domestic demand elasticity or a larger mar-
ket share of the domestic market increases the export supply 
elasticity, and thus attenuates the effectiveness of the export 
rebate. This result is consistent with the study by Ishikawa 
and Kuroda (2007), which finds that whether or not an export 
promotion policy improves the welfare of the export country 
depends on the slope of the inverse demand curve and the 
market share. 
If, instead, the linkage between the farm and retail mar-
kets is taken into consideration, the reduced-form supply 
price is as follows:
 
(21)
where , suggesting that after 
taking into account the farm-retail linkage, the effects of the 
export tax rebate on Chinese producers’ supply price become 
larger.
When one turns to the effects of this policy on the 
farm price, the relationship between the farm and the retail 
supply prices can be obtained by imposing the market clear-
ing condition in the farm market:
 
(22)
where the coefficient , indicating 
that the effects of a value-added tax or an export tax rebate 
on the farm price are in the same direction as the effects on 
the retail supply price. Therefore, an increase in the value-
added tax in the export market depresses the farm price. In 
other words, the farm price can be increased by an export tax 
rebate. For the farm price, the effectiveness of the export tax 
rebate is determined not only by the relative magnitude of 
the demand and supply elasticities of export and by the mar-
ket shares, but also by the relative magnitude of the demand 
and supply elasticities at the farm level and the price trans-
mission elasticity from the retail market to the farm market. 
A higher price transmission elasticity implies a larger effect 
of the export rebate on the farm price. Since 
,  has an upper 
limit of  and a lower limit of 0.
The measure for welfare
According to Alston et al. (1995), in a multi-stage mar-
ket, the measurement of welfare change is not affected by 
the choice of the market level to be measured. To avoid 
Table 1: Baseline data and model parameters.
Item Definition Value
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a Taken from Han et al. (1997), Dey (2008), and Ma (2004), respectively.  
b Taken from Dey (2008) 
c Taken from Graham et al. (1998) 
d Computed based on Tewari (2003): as 
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 changes, 
D
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*
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R
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h
h  varies too 
e See Appendix A for details 
f Taken from the Chinese Yearbook of Fishery Statistics (2012) and the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
g Taken from the Chinese Yearbook of Fishery Statistics (2012) and the Report of the Ministry of Agriculture of China. All data include tilapia, crustacean, and molluscs. Unit: 
million dollars 
h Computed based on the formulas in Sun and Kinnucan (2000) 
Source: own composition
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double counting, in this paper, we choose the retail market 
to measure welfare changes in the industry. Following Sun 
and Kinnucan (2001), by assuming parallel shifts of demand 
and supply curves, the welfare changes for Chinese domestic 
producers, domestic consumers, and foreign consumers are 
approximated by the following formulas:
 (23)
 (24)
 (25)
where  is the change in domestic consumer surplus 
associated with the export tax rebate changes;  is the 
change in producer surplus at the retail level;  is the 
change in the foreign consumer surplus due to a change in 
the export tax rebate. Moreover,  is the retail-level 
domestic consumer expenditure in the initial equilibrium; 
 is the total revenue of Chinese producers for both 
domestic and export markets in the initial equilibrium; and 
 is the foreign consumer expenditure on Chinese pro-
ducts. , , and  are the relative changes in retail-
level domestic demand price, supply price, and export price, 
respectively. Similarly, , , and  are the relative 
changes in retail-level domestic demand, total supply, and 
exports associated with the changes in the export tax rebate, 
respectively. Finally, VS is the percentage change in the retail 
price when the changes in both quantity and non-farm price 
equal zero.
As mentioned before, considering a multi-stage market 
allows us not only to represent a more realistic setting, but 
also to obtain the producer surplus changes in the farm mar-
ket as follows:
 (26)
where  is the change in farm producer surplus associ-
ated with a change in the export tax rebate;  is the 
revenue of farm producers in the initial equilibrium;  is the 
relative change in the farm price; and  is the relative change 
in farm supply.  VD is the percentage change in the farm price 
when the changes in both quantity and non-farm input price 
equal zero. 
Parameterization
To apply the above model to Chinese fishery sector, we 
survey the empirical literature to determine or derive the 
“best-bet” values for the numerical values of the elasticities 
of demand, supply, and price transmission. These values, 
combined with other necessary data in Table 1, are then used 
to simulate the effects of VAT and ETR on prices, trade flows, 
and welfare distribution. Among the parameter values, there 
is a large variation in the value of domestic demand elasticity 
reported by different studies. Thus, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed by considering alternative values of this param-
eter to determine sensitivity, and to highlight the finding that 
a higher domestic demand elasticity (which implies a higher 
export supply elasticity) impairs the effectiveness of the 
export tax rebate policy. Moreover, two scenarios are con-
sidered, depending on whether the vertical linkage between 
farm and retail markets is considered or not (Scenario 1 and 
Scenario 2, respectively).
Results
Pass-through of the export tax rebate
The incidence of the export tax rebate in the Chinese fish-
ery sector is shown in Table 2. For example, the reduced-
form elasticity of the domestic supply price with respect to 
the export tax rebate indicates the percentage change in the 
supply price associated with a percentage change in ETR. As 
mentioned before,  means that the linkage between 
farm and retail markets is considered. Since the non-farm 
price  is used to derive the parameters, we will not discuss 
its effects.
Focusing first on the retail market, when , a 1% 
increase in VAT5 is split between a 0.13%-0.55% increase in 
export price (as well as domestic demand price) and a 0.45%-
0.87% decrease in the Chinese supply price. Chinese produ-
cers have a heavier burden as the domestic demand elasticity 
rises. The higher domestic demand price reduces the quan-
tity demanded in the domestic market by about 0.17%-
0.21%. The lower supply price reduces the quantity of sup-
ply by about 0.17%-0.21%.
When it comes to the effects of the export tax rebate, 
Table 2 shows that a 1% increase in ETR is split between 
a 0.05%-0.09% increase in the retail supply price and a 
0.91%-0.95% decrease in the export price. In other words, 
the export tax rebate has a much larger effect on reducing 
the foreign consumers’ price than on improving the domestic 
producers’ one. As a result, the quantity of export is increased 
by 0.86%-0.90%, whereas the quantity of domestic supply is 
only increased by at most 0.04%. 
As the sensitivity analysis suggests, the domestic produc-
ers’ benefits get smaller when the domestic demand becomes 
more price elastic, which in turn increases the magnitude of 
the export supply elasticity. This highlights the fact that the 
positive effect of the export tax rebate on the supply price 
depends on the relative magnitude of the export supply and 
demand elasticities. Specifically, if the export supply elas-
ticity is much larger than the export demand elasticity, an 
export tax rebate has a small effect on increasing the domes-
tic supply price, but a large one on reducing the export price. 
Then, when one focuses on the farm market, an increase in 
the value-added tax reduces the quantity of supply at the retail 
level, and thus depresses the price at the farm level and reduces 
the quantity of farm supply and demand. On the other hand, a 
1% increase in ETR increases the farm quantity by 0.03% 
(which is insensitive to the change of ), and increases the 
farm price by 0.04-0.06%. Based on the foregoing results pre-
sented in Section 2, the reason for such results is clear: the 
retail supply is enlarged by an export tax rebate, and thus 
quantity and price for the farm are also enhanced.
5 It should be noted that a 1% change in variable ETR equals a 1% change in (1+rE) 
instead of a 1% change in rE. Similarly, a 1% change in variable VAT equals a 1% 
change in (1+rV), instead of a 1% change in rV.
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TWG under Scenario 1, and 57%-73% under scenario 2). 
This implies that, as highlighted by some financial commen-
tators and taxpayers, with the “best-bet” parameter values, 
the export rebate in the Chinese fishery sector is subsidising 
foreign consumers more than domestic producers. 
The value and percentage of the benefits for Chinese 
producers are enhanced even without considering the 
farm-retail connection, but such an increment is not suf-
ficient to alter the conclusion that foreign consumers are 
the major beneficiaries of the export tax rebate policy. The 
comparison between the two scenarios indicates that if we 
do not consider the farm market, the simulation results on 
values and percentage of domestic producer gains would be 
overestimated, and the loss for Chinese consumers would 
be underestimated. This sheds light on the importance of 
considering the farm-retail linkage even when the input 
markets are not of interest.
The sensitivity analysis shows that the total welfare gains 
are increasing with the growth of the domestic demand elas-
ticity with respect to price. Under both scenarios, the gains 
for domestic producers and the loss for domestic consum-
ers are both decreasing when the domestic demand becomes 
more price elastic (which makes the export supply become 
more elastic as well). This is consistent with the last section, 
in which we conclude that as the export supply elasticity of 
an industry rises, ceteris paribus, we expect the effects of the 
export tax rebate on domestic producers to decline. There-
fore, reducing the export supply elasticity (e.g., by improv-
ing the reliance on imports to reduce the domestic demand 
elasticity) may be helpful to enhance the effectiveness of the 
export rebate.
Dividing the welfare measurements of Scenario 1 in 
Table 3 by 25.11 million dollars (the government spend-
Results of Scenario 2 are also shown in Table 2. The 
comparison implies that, as indicated before, the change in 
the domestic supply price will be underestimated if the verti-
cal linkage is not considered. However, the supply quantity 
will be overestimated; thus, the welfare effects of not con-
sidering the farm-retail linkage are ambiguous, a topic which 
will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.
Distribution of the welfare gains
In order to simulate the distribution of welfare gains 
caused by the changes in ETR, inserting the reduced-form 
elasticities in Table 2 into equations (23)-(25) yields:
 
(27)
 
(28)
 
(29)
where , , , , , 
and  are set equal to the corresponding reduced-
form elasticities given in Table 2. 
The “best-bet” measure of the welfare changes is pre-
sented in Table 3. All results are for a 1% increase in ETR. 
The third, fifth, and seventh columns show how an increase 
in welfare is distributed between Chinese producers and for-
eign consumers. Generally, under both scenarios, the total 
welfare gains (TWG) range from 32.93-42.61 million dol-
lars, most of which go to foreign consumers (60%-75% of 
Table 2: Reduced-form elasticities.
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ing corresponding to a 1% increase in the export tax rebate) 
yields the marginal benefit-cost ratios (MBCRs) shown in 
Table 4.
The results for MBCR1 suggest that the total welfare 
gains overweigh the government expenditure if TWG is 
con-sidered as comprising the overall “benefits” of this 
policy.  MBCR1 increases with a reduction in .
.
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=
. However, 
as discussed, the total welfare gains are shared between 
domestic producers and foreign consumers, and with the 
“best-bet” elasticities, the latter obtain most of the benefits. 
Only in the extreme cases where the export demand elastic-
ity approaches 1 or the export supply elasticity approaches 
0 can the entire export tax rebate be passed on to Chinese 
producers. Therefore, the results for MBCR
2
 are of more 
interest to us. When the domestic demand elasticity is 
between -0.31 to -1.40,  MBCR
2 
ranges from 0.33 to 0.63. 
We also compute MBCR
3
, which takes the Chinese con-
sumer surplus into account, as Kinnucan and Cai (2011) 
state that, when analysing the effectiveness of a trade pro-
motion policy, the so called “societal MBCRs” should not 
be ignored, for they indicate the effectiveness from a soci-
etal perspective, instead of an industry one. The results 
imply that when MBCR1 equals 1.31-1.56, MBCR3 approxi-
mates 0, due to the fact that the benefits for domestic pro-
ducers are almost completely offset by the loss for domes-
tic consumers. This is in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Alston et al., 1993; Wohlgenant, 1986), which find that 
with the assumptions of no distortion in other sectors and 
the opportunity cost of government spending equals the 
amount of payment, such export promotion policies are a 
costly way to improve domestic producers’ welfare.
According to Alston and James (2002), the changes in 
retail-level producer surplus equal the sum of changes in the 
producer surplus for all inputs. Thus, considering the farm-
retail linkage enables us to obtain the distribution of the wel-
fare gains for Chinese producers between farm and non-farm 
input producers. To this end, we rewrite equation (26) as fol-
lows, and then calculate the welfare changes of both inputs 
with equation (30) and the results for  in Table 3. The 
results are presented in Table 5.
 
(30)
where  and  are set equal to the correspond-
ing reduced-form elasticities given in Table 2.
Table 5 indicates that the welfare distribution between 
producers of farm and non-farm inputs is very sensitive to 
the variation of . Farmers’ share of the welfare gains 
improves dramatically with the increase in China’s domestic 
demand elasticity in the fishery sector. As the domestic 
demand becomes more price elastic, farmers gradually 
become the biggest winners at the input markets. When 
ranges from -0.31 to -1.40, farmers obtain 7.32 to 9.26 mil-
lion dollars, accounting for 46% to 99% of the total producer 
surplus.
Table 3: Welfare distribution at the retail level (million dollars).
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Table 4: Marginal benefit-cost ratios for a 1% increase in ETR in 
the Chinese fishery sector.
 dh MBCR1 MBCR2 MBCR3
-0.31 1.56 0.63 Approximately 0
-0.80 1.43 0.46 Approximately 0
-1.40 1.31 0.33 Approximately 0
Note: ; ; . 
Source: own composition
Table 5: Welfare distribution at input level (million dollars).
  Item Welfare 
Changes
Share of 
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Note: share of gains = ∆PSF (or ∆PSN) /∆PSD  
Source: Own composition
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Discussion and conclusion
The basic premise of this study is that when considering 
an export tax rebate, the policymakers should not be indiffer-
ent about the benefit distribution among groups. This paper 
finds that the effectiveness of the export tax rebate on domes-
tic producers depends on the relative magnitude of the export 
supply and demand elasticities. When the export country has 
a relatively large export supply elasticity, the benefits of 
domestic producers are very limited. Applying the model 
to the Chinese fishery sector, we find that with the “best-
bet” parameters, although the total welfare gains overweigh 
the cost for the government, most of the gains go to foreign 
consumers. When considering the welfare changes of Chi-
nese consumers, according to Gardner’s (1983) criterion6, 
the export tax rebate is efficient (under Scenario 1, dPS/dCS 
approaches 1.00). Nevertheless, from a societal perspective, 
the marginal benefit-cost ratio is almost zero.
Our results are consistent with the previous literature in 
that when considering an export promotion policy which 
redistributes welfare among producers, consumers and tax-
payers, the policy makers have to assign weightings among 
these groups (Wohlgenant, 1986). Moreover, this paper 
emphasizes the importance of considering the transfer from 
domestic consumers and taxpayers to foreign consumers. 
Our derivation indicates that the export supply elasticity 
is determined by the elasticities of supply and domestic 
demand, and by the relevant market share. Therefore, in 
an industry with a relatively large domestic market share, 
a large domestic demand elasticity, or a large retail supply 
elasticity, the policymakers should be more prudent when 
considering such policies.
Another policy implication of this paper is that when 
evaluating a trade promotion policy in an agricultural sec-
tor, it is of great importance to take into account the benefits 
allocation among input producers, which has hardly received 
attention in the literature. In an industry with a relatively 
higher domestic demand elasticity, it is expected to have a 
larger effect on farm producers. 
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, the 
export tax rebate is not considered as a subsidy as long as the 
tax rebate does not outweigh the tax paid by companies. The 
aim is to let the exports enter the international markets at tax-
excluded prices and thus avoid double taxation on exports. 
The reduced-form elasticities indicate that the value-added 
tax raises the export price and lowers the quantity of exports. 
Hence without the rebate (or with an incomplete rebate), the 
value-added tax acts as an export tax (Feldstein and Krug-
man, 1990). Therefore, if the WTO requires its members to 
phase out export taxes, an export tax rebate system may be 
utilised as an export tax to realise export control. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the model is based on 
the assumption that the price of non-farm inputs is exog-
enous. However, this may not be the case in reality. Hence 
the relaxation of this assumption provides a topic for fur-
ther research to extend the present analysis. Moreover, the 
simulation results are based on elasticity values taken from 
6 Gardner (1983) states that, when dPS/dCS approaches 1.00, the deadweight loss 
per dollar of consumers’ welfare transferred to producers is zero at the margin, thus the 
policy designed to benefit producers is considered efficient.
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Appendix A. Derivation of price 
transmission elasticities
In a two-input, one-output demand and supply system, the 
output supply and the input demand functions are given by:
 (A.1)
 (A.2) 
 (A.3)
By taking the logarithmic total differential of the first two 
equations we get:
 (A.4)
and
 (A.5)
Thus, we get equations as follows:
 (A.6)
and 
, (A.7)
where εRF and ηFR are the elasticity of retail supply with 
respect to the farm price and the elasticity of farm demand 
with respect to the retail price, respectively. To obtain the 
values of εRF and ηFR, the above demand and supply system 
can be written as:
 (A.8)
 (A.9)
 (A.10)
With the restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry:
 (A.11)
 (A.12)
 (A.13)
 (A.14)
 (A.15)
 (A.16)
Together with the values of εR, ηF, and ηN, the values of 
εRF and ηFR can be obtained. 
